Abstract This paper provides a simple and transparent proof of a new social choice impossibility theorem. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow's impossibility theorem are straightforward corollaries.
with n and number alternatives with i, j, k. Let P be the set of all possible relations on M that are complete, asymmetric, and transitive, i.e., strict preference relations. 1 A preference profile is an ordered list = ( 1 , . . . , N ) with n ∈ P for every 1 ≤ n ≤ N . All possible preference profiles form the collection P N .
Definition 1 (SCF)
A social choice function F: P N → A assigns to each ∈ P N a choice F( ) ∈ A. Definition 2 (SPF) A social preference function R: P N → P assigns to each ∈ P N a preference relation R( ) ∈ P.
Several definitions facilitate communication.
Definition 3 For profile , a i dominates a j if a i n a j for every n.
Definition 4 Two profiles and
agree on {a i , a j } if a i n a j is necessary and sufficient for a i n a j for every n.
Definition 5 A ⊂ A is at the top of if a i n a j for every n, every a i ∈ A , and every a j ∈ A\A . If in addition A = {a i , a j }, we call a {i, j}-runoff.
Definition 6 A runoff generating function T i j : P N → P N brings A = {a i , a j } to the top, keeping internal rankings of A and A\A intact. 
This condition requires every social choice to be a generalized Condorcet winner in that it has to win any runoff it enters that keeps intact its rankings against the opponent. Losing a {i, j}-runoff prevents a i from winning any profile that agrees with it on {a i , a j }, no matter what rule-for example, simple majority, super majority, or weighted majority-determines the runoff outcome. In particular, if
We often apply the contrapositive statement.
Lemma 1 (O) and (CM) imply (WP).
Proof Let a i dominate a j in . (O) ensures that F( ) = a i for some . By (CM), the choice remains a i for T ik ( ), where k / ∈ {i, j}, and further for T i j (T ik ( )). Since a j loses the {i, j}-runoff T i j (T ik ( )) that agrees with on {a i , a j }, the choice for cannot be a j .
Theorem 1 If a SCF F satisfies (O) and (CM), then it is dictatorial.
Proof Pick any with {a i } and {a i , a j } at the top. Swap the positions of {a i , a j } sequentially from 1 to N . By (WP), the choice is either a i or a j , starting with a i and ending with a j . The (i, j)-pivotal voter n i j is the first whose swap makes a difference. By (CM), any two (i, j)-runoffs that agree on {a i , a j } select the same alternative, so n i j is independent of which (with {a i } and {a i , a j } at the top) we start with. Consider depicted profiles and with {a i , a j , a k } at the top, where columns correspond to voters and squares mark possible positions of a k . The definition of n i j informs us that F(T i j ( )) = a i and F(T i j ( )) = a j , so F( ) = a j and F( ) = a i by (CM). For , the choice is a i , for (WP) rules out a k and others. Hence, F(T ik ( )) = a i , implying that in defining n ik , no swap before n i j makes a difference, i.e., n ik ≥ n i j . But j and k are arbitrary, so n i j = n ik , i.e., n i− refers to the same individual.
Moreover, T ik ( ) and agree on {a i , a k }, so F( ) is not a k due to its loss to a i in {i, k}-runoff T ik ( ). We are left with F( ) = a j , so F(T jk ( )) = a j , demanding by (CM) that
In defining n jk , ( * ) says that no swap before n i j makes a difference, so n jk ≥ n i j or n j− ≥ n i− . But i and j are arbitrary, confirming n j− = n i− . The single pivotal voter can eliminate any alternative except her favorite by ( * ).
for every n, every , and every n .
This condition demands that an individual is worse off misreporting her preferences whenever a misreport can influence the choice, so truth-telling is optimal.
Lemma 2 (SP) imply (CM).
Proof Let and {i, j}-runoff agree on {a i , a j }. Suppose that F( ) = a i and
Since is a {i, j}-runoff, k = j, contradicting the agreement of and on {a i , a j }. So F( 1 , −1 ) has to remain a i . Likewise, the process of updating to one by one keeps the choice unaltered.
Theorem 2 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite) If a SCF F satisfies (O) and (SP), then it is dictatorial.
Proving Arrow's theorem is equally simple.
Definition 12 (AD) A SPF R is Arrow dictatorial if there exists a social preference dictator n such that a i n a j implies a i R( )a j for every i, j and every . Proof Given R, we can define a SCF F R that selects the alternative ranked highest by R. F R obviously satisfies (O), because by (AU), F R ( ) = a i if only {a i } is at the top. To see (CM), let and {i, j}-runoff
Definition 13 (AU) A SPF R is
Theorem 1 thus presents a social choice dictator n of F R . She is a social preference dictator too. If a i n a j , individual n dictates F R (T i j ( )) = a i , so a i R(T i j ( ))a j and by (AIIA) a i R( )a j .
Concluding remarks
The simplicity is no coincidence. Our main theorem employs assumptions that are almost logically minimal (Yu 2013) . Traditionally, people prove the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem as a corollary of the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite 1977) . But the "monotonicity" condition assumed is more restrictive than (CM), making it a weaker theorem than ours. Reny (2001) has to circumvent the difficulty by giving parallel proofs of Arrow's theorem and the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem. Mas-Colell et al. (1995) prove Arrow's theorem first, but as a step toward the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem, the construction of R F , a SPF derived from a SCF, is necessarily more involved than that of F R . Building on these earlier works, 2 our framework offers an alternative way of unifying and teaching classical theorems.
